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OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
88 Transit Lines, Inc. (the "Company") has petitioned
this court for review from a final order of the National Labor
Relations Board entered in supplemental backpay proceedings (88
Transit Lines, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 324 (1994)) and the NLRB has
cross-applied for enforcement of the same order.
I.
The supplemental backpay proceeding followed our
decision enforcing an earlier NLRB finding that the Company
discriminated against its employees when, shortly after a
representation election conducted at the Company's
facility, the Company replaced its transit run schedule which had
been in effect for many years, Schedule B, with a Schedule C,
thereby decreasing the total number of fixed transit runs by one
and eliminating run 14, reducing the number of transit runs which

were open for bids, and making the fixed runs subject to
discretionary assignment by the Company rather than open for bids
based on seniority.

The Board found that the scheduling change

violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3) and ordered the Company
to "make employees whole for any losses they may have suffered as
a result of these unlawful actions" and this court entered
judgment enforcing the order.

See 88 Transit Lines, Inc., 300

N.L.R.B. 177 (1990), enforced, 937 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1991).
When the parties failed to agree on the amount of
backpay, the Regional Director issued a backpay specification
alleging the amount owed to the discriminatees.

Following a

hearing, an ALJ recommended amending the backpay specification in
two aspects.

First, the ALJ recommended not awarding backpay to

fourteen replacement workers who had been hired during the
backpay period, reasoning that "such employees have no losses to
be restored to them, since they were not employed at the time of
the elimination of run 14."

Second, the ALJ recommended treating

as interim earnings any amount by which post-unfair labor
practice earnings exceeded employee earnings during the baseperiod year.
The Board refused to adopt these recommended amendments
to the backpay specification.

It ordered backpay for all twenty-

three employees, including the fourteen replacement employees,
and refused to reduce their gross backpay by post-unfair labor
practice earnings which exceeded the base period earnings because
to do so would "inappropriate[ly] appl[y] . . . the interim
earnings' concept to a case involving a violation other than

discharge from employment, and . . . effectively resolve[]
uncertainties in favor of the wrongdoer."

The Board ordered

backpay to be calculated in accordance with the original
specification, plus interest and less tax withholdings required
by law.
This court has jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
and (f).

On questions of law, appellate review of the Board's

decision is plenary, although that decision is entitled to
deference due to the Board's expertise in labor matters.
Louton, Inc., 822 F.2d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1987).

NLRB v.

The Board's

findings of fact in a backpay proceeding will be overturned if
the record, considered as a whole, shows no substantial evidence
to support those findings.
U.S. 474 (1951).

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340

We will not disturb a backpay order "'unless it

can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends
other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the
policies of the Act.'"

Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,

339 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943)).
II.
It is undisputed that the backpay specification issued
by the Regional Director correctly designated the backpay period
to be between November 29, 1987, when the Company first
instituted the schedule change, and August 18, 1991, when the
Company restored run 14, a total of 194 weeks.

Both parties also

agree that the implementation of schedule C represented a loss to
the bargaining unit of 2-3/4 hours of work per day, or 13-3/4

hours per week, and that the wage rate for the discriminatees was
$6.75 per hour.
In arguing that the Board's order is not supported by
substantial evidence and an abuse of discretion, the Company
raises essentially three claims of error:

(1) the Board erred in

finding that the fourteen replacement drivers were entitled to
compensation; (2) the Board erred in declining to treat as
interim earnings the amount by which the discriminatees' postunfair labor practice annual earnings exceeded their base-period
year earnings with the Company; and (3) the ALJ's post-hearing
amendment of the backpay specification denied the Company
procedural due process.1
The Company argues that the fourteen replacement
drivers are not entitled to compensation for backpay because they
were hired after the schedule change went into effect and, thus,
they suffered no change in their schedules entitling them to
compensation.

By way of analogy, it relies on Systems

Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990), to argue
1

. The Company also argues that the backpay specification failed
to establish any loss of earnings by any employee during the
backpay period and was therefore speculative and an undeserved
windfall to the employees. The Company agrees that a compliance
officer may employ a formula other than one of the standard
formulae when application of the standard formula is not
feasible. In this case, the General Counsel specified the names
of the twenty-three discriminatees and the number of hours each
worked during the backpay period and, applying the backpay
formula, calculated that each discriminatee lost $4.04 per week
for each week worked during the backpay period. The backpay
formula adopted by the Board is reasonable in light of the nature
of the violation and is entitled to our deference. See NLRB v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953).

that the Board's award of backpay to the fourteen replacement
drivers was punitive rather than compensatory because it "cannot
be considered a restoration to any status quo ante, as no status
quo ante existed for these employees."

Id. at 308 (quotation

omitted).
The Company's reliance on Systems Management, however,
is misplaced.

In Systems Management, this court enforced a cease

and desist order and a make-whole order where a successor
employer failed to offer employment to its predecessor's
employees or to recognize their bargaining representative, Local
29, and instead contracted with another union, Local 327, at a
substantially lower wage rate.

Id. at 301.

The court declined

to enforce a backpay award for new hires affiliated with Local
327 who "if anything . . . were beneficiaries of [the employer's]
discriminatory conduct, because the result of [the employer's]
decision not to employ the Local 29 workers culminated in the
employment of the Local 327 workers."

Id. at 308.

This case presents quite different facts.

The fourteen

replacement employees were hired to replace original bargaining
unit employees who departed in the normal course of business.
Therefore, the replacement employees cannot be said to be the
"beneficiaries" of the discriminatory conduct.

Rather, the

change in schedule caused a loss of work for the entire
bargaining unit.

The Board correctly found that the remedy was

to inure to the benefit of the entire bargaining unit.

The award

of backpay to the fourteen replacement employees was not
"'punitive or confiscatory'" and was "'reasonably adapted to the

situation that call[ed] for the redress.'"

See Frito-Lay, Inc.

v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting NLRB v.
Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir.
1976)).
The Company's second argument is that the Board's
refusal to deduct post-unfair labor practice earnings which
exceeded base-year earnings from the gross backpay violated the
long-standing principle that discriminatees must mitigate damages
and that gross backpay must be reduced by interim earnings to
derive a net backpay award.

The Company refers us to a leading

case on the mitigation doctrine, NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc.,
472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972), as well as to NLRB guidelines.
This argument must also fail.

It is true that

mitigation of loss of earnings is a cardinal principle in the
development of remedial orders under the National Labor Relations
Act.

See Tubari Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1992).

In this case, however, the higher post-unfair labor practice
earnings by bargaining unit members were attributable to
fluctuations in the amount of available work during the
applicable time period rather than to the restoration of lost
work by the Company.

It is reasonable to assume that but for the

Company's discriminatory conduct and the elimination of transit
run 14, the earnings of the bargaining unit employees might have
been still higher.

Thus, the higher post-unfair labor practice

earnings were not interim earnings which need be deducted from
gross backpay.

The Company has provided us with no authority for

its argument that it can avoid the payment of backpay liability

for its discriminatory schedule change simply because
discriminatees happened to do better financially during the
backpay period than during the base-year period.2

The burden was

on the Company "to establish facts which would negative the
existence of liability to a given employee or which would
mitigate that liability."

NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d

447, 454 (8th Cir. 1963).

Accord Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787,

789-90 (3d Cir. 1968) (in banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828
(1969).

This it has not done.

We find the Company's argument

that the gross backpay should be reduced by the excess earnings
to be without merit.3
III.

2

. The Company argues that the Board erred when it suggested in
its Supplemental Order that the interim earnings principle
applies only with respect to employees who have been unlawfully
discharged. It cites Ironton Publications, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B.
1208 (1994), as an example of a case where the Board's backpay
order was reduced by interim earnings for a part-time employee
whose hours were discriminatorily reduced but who was not fired.
We do not read the Board's Supplemental Order to mean that
reduction for interim earnings is never appropriate in a nondischarge case. Rather, we limit our holding to approval of the
Board's rejection of the need to reduce backpay by interim
earnings in this case, where the employees continued to work for
the same company and there was no showing that they would not
have absorbed the hours stipulated to have been lost by the
unfair labor practice.
3

. The Company's final argument is that the ALJ's post-hearing
amendment of the backpay specification did not afford the Company
an adequate opportunity to produce evidence of employee interim
earnings. In light of our holding that the backpay award need
not be reduced by what the Company characterizes as "interim
earnings," consideration of the Company's contentions on this
issue is unnecessary.

For the reasons set forth, we will deny the Petition
for Review of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board
issued on July 12, 1994 and grant the Cross-Application for
Enforcement of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board
issued on July 12, 1994.

